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Abstract
This document explains the purpose, history, and philosophy of the Overarching
Properties, and explains the specific details of eachproperty, the relationships among
them, and some practical considerations that attach to their use. Although it has
been extensively reviewed by over a dozen members of the Overarching Properties
Working Group, it does not constitute official guidance, nor does it necessarily
express a unanimously agreed view of the Working Group on every detail.
1 Prelude
The Overarching Properties are intended to define a sufficient set of properties for
making approval decisions. That is, when approval is sought for using a particular
entity on an aircraft, if the entity can be shown to possess these properties in their
entirety, then granting approval for using that entity on an aircraft is appropriate.
Hence the name: properties because they encapsulate the “characteristic qualities” [1]
necessary to justify approval; overarching because they are intended to “encompass
all” [2] of the necessary properties1.
The purpose of this document is to explain the Overarching Properties includ-
ing their philosophical foundation, the specific details of each property, the rela-
tionships among them, and some practical considerations that attach to their use.
The abbreviation OPs (pronounced “oh-peas”, not “awps” or “oh-pea-ess”) will be
used in place of the full phrase from time to time, but not always, as the abbreviation
seems aesthically displeasing in some sentences.
Readers of this document are assumed to be at least somewhat familiar with
current laws, regulations, and processes governing certification of airborne sys-
tems, software, and electronic hardware. Because the Overarching Properties are
expressed at a much higher level of abstraction than is common today, however,
readers without intimate knowledge of current practice might find understanding
the Overarching Properties easier than readers with such knowledge.
The document’s structure is as follows. The remainder of this section presents
some background information. Section 2 explains the philosophy underlying the
Overarching Properties. The OPs themselves are then explained in detail in Sec-
tion 3. Comments about issues that may arise in practice when the OPs are used
are made in Section 4. The document concludes in Section 5 with brief speculative
remarks about the future of the OPs.
1Some readers will be happy with this paragraph; some others will not. If you are an unhappy
reader, this footnote is for you. Yes, the word “entity” is vague, intentionally so. Later sections of the
document should remove the vagueness; however, if you cannot wait, you can substitute the phrase
“systems, software, or airborne electronic hardware” without much harm. Similarly, if you are miffed
by the use of the word “possess” instead of “satisfy”, feel free to substitute the latter for the former. It
is tradition in some circles to talk of ’satisfying’ properties; such usage cannot be deemed wrong, but
’conditions’ are better said to be ’satisfied’ and ’properties’ to be ’possessed’.
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1.1 Brief history
That which are now called the Overarching Properties originated in a workshop
in December 2015. The workshop was sponsored by the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration (FAA), who selected the invitees to this workshop, seeking to ensure in-
dustry and governmental participation from across a wide area of technical disci-
plines, countries, and assurance viewpoints. The effort continued with two more
invitation-only meetings in April and July 2016, periodic virtual meetings, and an
online forum, resulting in a set of three Overarching Properties.
These OPs were presented to the public in September 13–15, 2016 at the 2016
FAA Streamlining Assurance Processes Workshop in Richardson, Texas. The Over-
arching Properties work was only one of the activities discussed, along with the
other ongoing activities collectedunder the “streamlining assurance processes” ban-
ner. A handout containing the Overarching Properties was distributed to attendees
without any additional printed explanatory material. To supplement the written
material, oral presentations were delivered and several discussion sessions held.
Workshopparticipants expressed opinions across awide spectrum ranging from
(to use slang appropriate to the location) “madder than a wet hen” to “ready and
rarin’ to go.” A sufficient number (and percentage) of opinions were positive that
the decision was made to continue the work, recognizing that several years of effort
would be needed to complete it.
To accomplish this remaining work, virtual meetings and forum activity contin-
ued through the remainder of 2016, resulting in some relatively minor changes to
the OPs. In early 2017 the team was dubbed the Overarching Properties Working
Group (OPWG).Newpeople joined the team, and some original teammembers left.
At the same time a European research project, Re-Engineering and Streamlining the
Standards for Avionics Certification (RESSAC), initiated an effort to conduct several
case studies in using the OPs. Several RESSAC members were also members of the
OPWG.
Most of the work throughout 2017 and 2018 involved trying to develop a collec-
tion of criteria for use in evaluating OP possession. Both direct (criteria for evalu-
ating whether a specific product2 possesses the OPs) and indirect (criteria for eval-
uating whether an applicant’s proposed processes are sufficient to ensure prod-
ucts produced using those processes will possess the OPs) approaches were inves-
tigated. The results of RESSAC case studies completed in the summer of 2018 iden-
tified deficiencies in both the direct and indirect criteria approaches. A different
approach to evaluation is currently being investigated; it is based on requiring the
use of explicit arguments giving the reasons for believing a product possesses the
Overarching Properties. Once the evaluation work is completed, a separate docu-
ment will be written to provide information and guidelines about the subject.
The version of the Overarching Properties described in this document was fin-
ished during a physical meeting in April 2019. The changes from the version pre-
sented at the public workshop are mostly not substantial but rather subtle or edi-
torial. The change in format from three separate pages, one for each property, to a
2The word product is simply a shorthand for “an entity for which approval is sought.”
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single page is the most visible difference. Nevertheless, someone who last saw the
OPs at the public workshop should recognize the version discussed here without
much difficulty.
1.2 Presentation style
This document is written in a conversational style, unlike the more formal styles
usually employed in standards and guidance documents. Two reasons motivate
the choice. One, a conversational style is more likely to facilitate understanding by
actively engaging the reader than is a formal style. Two, using a different writing
style helps emphasize the fact that the Overarching Properties approach is substan-
tially different in at least some respects from current approaches. The less a reader
tries tomake analogies between the OP approach and current approaches, themore
likely he or she is to gain a correct understanding of what the Overarching Proper-
ties are all about3.
Text from theOverarching Properties is displayed in sans-serif type. Words and
phrases for which explicit definitions are an essential element of the OP are set initalic sans-serif type. Quotations of more than a few words are set off from the sur-
rounding text by typesetting them as paragraphs with slightly narrowed margins.
Only the text thus displayed is normative. All other text is explanatory, instructive,
or illustrative. Any apparent conflicts between the normative and non-normative
parts are unintentional and should be identified for correction. Please note: the
electronic version of this document contains many internal hyperlinks, which are
identified by rectangular boxes around the text.
2 Philosophy
Before describing the Overarching Properties, some words are needed about the
philosophy and associated principles upon which the properties are based. Hence,
this section.
As a way to grasp the philosophy, the reader is invited to join in a thought ex-
periment. Imagine, if you can, a world very much like our own, but different in
one single, significant way. In this imaginary world—let’s call it Earth* for ease of
reference—a perfect oracle lives. Let’s name this perfect oracle Quinn. Quinn is a
perfect oracle because for any statement P with a truth value, if Quinn says that P
is true, then P is true indeed; if Quinn says P is false, then P is false indeed.
Here are three trivial examples:
• If Quinn says it is raining hard outside, you should take a sturdy umbrella
with you when you leave the house.
3A good analogy facilitates understanding; a bad one impedes it. Discouraging bad analogies
motivated changing the original name (“meta-objectives”). The OPs are not in any meaningful sense
similar to ’objectives’ as that term is used in documents such as RTCADO-178C [3], RTCADO-254 [4],
and ARP 4754A [5]. The non-similarity of the OPs and ’objectives’ is so important to understand,
repeating the previous sentence seems appropriate. The OPs are not in any meaningful sense similar
to ’objectives’ as that term is used in documents such as DO-178C.
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• If Quinn says the dog doesn’t bite, you can pet it without fearing for the phys-
ical integrity of your hand.
• If Quinn says that the value of the Acme Corporation’s stock will go up by
125% this year, then you can buy stock in Acme without worrying that you
might lose money this year.
Moving to a more directly relevant example, suppose Quinn says that a partic-
ular product—software for an automated landing system, perhaps—is suitable for
installation in an aircraft. You can know for certain that the product is suitable. Thus,
if you are chargedwith deciding to approve or disapprove the product, you can con-
fidently approve it, without any fear of making the wrong decision. You don’t even
need to know what specific regulations the product is required to satisfy4; Quinn’s
blessing is enough.
Let’s change the example a bit. Suppose Quinn has a wickedly playful streak.
He refuses to answer a single direct question about a product’s suitability for instal-
lation on an aircraft. Instead he insists you must ask him three separate questions:
• Does the product possess the property of Intent?
• Does the product possess the property of Correctness?
• Does the product possess the property of Innocuity?
He further tells you can be confident in approving the product only if he answers
“Yes” to all three questions5.
Given Quinn’s conditional statement, what must you know to warrant conclud-
ing the product is suitable for installation on an aircraft? You need to knowwhether
the product possesses (a) the property of Intent, (b) the property of Correctness,
and (c) the property of Innocuity. In our imaginary Earth* with the statements from
the perfect oracle Quinn, you do not need to knowwhat these properties mean, but
only if your product possesses them.
To determine whether the product possesses these three properties on Earth*
you need only to ask Quinn, in any order you like. Does the product possess In-nocuity? Does it possess Intent? Does it possess Correctness? If Quinn answers,
“Yes,” to all three questions, you can confidently approve the product. If Quinn
answers, “No,” to one or more of the questions, you can confidently disapprove the
product.
You do not need to know anything at all about how the product was built, nor
about the competency of its builders. You need no insight into the processes used in
its development. You do not even need to know anything about the three properties
themselves. Nor do you need to know anything about the regulations that govern
4Just in case you are wondering, the regulations on our imaginary Earth* are identical to the reg-
ulations in our world.
5As another instantiation of his wickedly playful streak, he also tells you that a “No” answer to
one or more of the questions does not necessarily mean the product is unsuitable, but only that you
ought not approve it without additional information.
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the product. In our imaginary Earth* with the perfect oracle Quinn, Quinn’s word
alone is enough.
Let’s now return to the real Earth. Sadly, our Earth has no perfect oracle named
Quinn, nor any perfect oracle with some other name. Happily, however, the non-
existence of a perfect oracle does not invalidate the underlying principle just illus-
trated:
Given a set of properties that are sufficient to establish the suitability of
a product for installation on an aircraft, a product that truly possesses
all of the properties can be confidently granted approval for installation.
Successfully applying this principle requires only knowing that (A) the set of
properties is sufficient, and (B) a product possesses all of the properties.
The Overarching Properties rest on the assumption that they satisfy (A). To be
more precise, they rest on the assumption that the text of the OPs, properly inter-
preted, specifies a sufficient set of properties; that is, no additional properties are
needed. Or in other words, it is not possible for a product to truly possess the OPs,
while also having deficiencies that should legitimately prevent it from being ap-
proved. A corollary of this assumption is the further assumption that the OP text
is either unambiguous as to its meaning or, alternatively, that any ambiguities that
exist resolve to equally permissible interpretations, all ofwhich preserve sufficiency.
The word assumption is used in the previous paragraph because the sufficiency
of the OPs has not yet been demonstrated conclusively. Because sufficiency is more
a matter of practicalities than philosophy, further discussion of the issue is delayed
until Section 4.2.
Concerning (B)—knowing that a product possesses all of the properties—the
existing state of the practice does not allow certainty6 (except perhaps for imprac-
tically simple cases). Whereas on Earth* insight into the processes used to develop
a product is unnecessary, such insight is an important and essential aspect of cur-
rent approval approaches. Adopting an approval process based on the Overarching
Properties will not change the need for insight7.
Keeping the fundamental difference between (A) and (B) clear is essential to
understanding the rest of this document. A reader who does not keep clear the
distinction runs a substantial risk of conflating questions about the meaning of the
OPs and questions about how to evaluate possession theOPs in practice. Both types
of questions are important, but this document is intended to answer only questions
of the first type. As noted previously a future document will address evaluation
matters.
3 Properties
We are now ready to discuss the three Overarching Properties themselves. The full
description is shown in Figure 1; it consists of five parts:
6Whether certainty may one day be possible in this area is an interesting question in epistemology.
7It may alter the type of insight needed, but insight into processes will still be necessary, at least
until substantial breakthroughs are made in the state-of-the-art and state-of-the–practice.
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Intent: The defined intended behavior is correct and complete with respect to the desired 
behavior. 
Correctness: The implementation is correct with respect to its defined intended behavior, under 
foreseeable operating conditions. 
Innocuity: Any part of the implementation that is not required by the defined intended behavior 
has no unacceptable impact.  
 
Definitions 
a. Desired behavior: Needs and constraints expressed by the stakeholders (this includes those needs and constraints 
identified by the safety assessment and those mandated by regulations). 
b. Defined intended behavior: The record of the desired behavior. 
c. Implementation: Item or combination of inter-related items for which acceptance or approval is being sought. 
d. Item: A hardware or software element having bounded and well-defined interfaces.  
e. Foreseeable operating conditions: External and internal conditions in which the system is used, encompassing all 
known normal and abnormal conditions. 
f. Unacceptable impact: An impact that compromises the safety assessment. 
g. Safety assessment: The systematic identification of failure conditions and classifications in an operational context, 
evaluation of the architecture against safety objectives arising from these hazards, evaluation of potential 
common modes and threats, defining additional intended behaviors to support claims within these evaluations and 
showing that the safety objectives are satisfied by the implementation. 
h. Failure condition: “A condition having an effect on the [aircraft] and/or its occupants, either direct or 
consequential, which is caused or contributed to by one or more failures or errors, considering flight phase and 
relevant adverse operational or environmental conditions or external events.”  (from AMC 25.1309)  
Requisites for showing possession of the Overarching Properties 
a. Defined intended behavior exists. 
b. Failure conditions are defined. 
c. The record of the safety assessment exists. 
d. The record of the foreseeable operating conditions exists. 
e. The implementation exists. 
f. Development Assurance Levels (DALs) are assigned using the failure condition classifications. 
Assumptions which need only be stated, not justified 
a. Stakeholders have the knowledge to express the desired behavior. 
b. Performing safety assessment is not covered by these Overarching Properties. 
Constraints on how Overarching Property possession must be demonstrated 
a. The process to ensure possession of the Overarching Properties must be defined and conducted as defined.  
b. The means by which the defined intended behavior is shown to be correct and complete is commensurate with the 
DAL. 
c. Criteria for evaluating the artifacts are defined and shown to be satisfied individually and collectively. 
d. All artifacts are under configuration management and change control. 
e. When tiers of decomposition are used, the means of showing correctness among the tiers and to the defined 
intended behavior must be defined and conducted as defined. 
f. The implementation must be correct when functioning as part of the integrated system or in environment(s) 
representative of the integrated system. 
g. All design and manufacturing data to support consistent replication of the type design and instructions for 
continued airworthiness must be established. 
h. The safety assessment must address all of the implementation.  
 
Figure 1. The Overarching Properties
6
• Statements of the three Overarching Properties themselves, including a label
for each
• Definitions for words or phrases used in the Overarching Properties descrip-
tion
• Requisites that must exist to allow Overarching Property possession to be
shown
• Assumptions that need only be stated, not justified, in the demonstration of
the possession of the Overarching Properties
• Constraints on how Overarching Property possession must be demonstrated
The content of these parts is discussed below. Before beginning the discussion,
some preliminary comments are in order.
Only two of these five parts are strictly necessary: statements and definitions. That
is, the meaning of each Overarching Property is fully specified by the statement of
the property as interpreted according to the relevant definitions.
The statement, the definitions in particular, and the other sections more gener-
ally, were formulated based on lessons taught by experience and research studies [6]
concerning the common human tendency to ignore explicit written definitions for
terms one already believes one understands. To combat this tendency, we chose to
not use common terms such as requirements, validation, or verification in the state-
ments. If we used these common terms, many people would naturally but subcon-
sciously ignore the provided definitions, relying on their own definitions instead.
Because these pre-existing definitions differ and sometimes conflict among dif-
ferent domains and contexts, the meaning of the Overarching Properties would in-
evitably be perceived quite differently by several different groups of people. Some
differences in perception are unavoidable8, but we hope that eschewing ambiguous
common terms has increased the likelihood that people will read and rely on our
explicit definitions to inform their understanding of the Overarching Properties.
Hence, we further hope that the likelihood of unresolvable, conflicting perceptions
is less than it otherwise would be.
The label for each OP statement (that is Intent, Correctness, and Innocuity is
semantically superfluous. It exists to provide a convenient means for referencing
each OP. Although an OP’s label was chosen to be indicative of the content, no ac-
tual meaning attaches to it. For readers familiar with computer programming, you
may want to think of the label as similar to a variable name. Two otherwise tex-
tually identical programs remain semantically identical even if one program uses
the variable nameAltitudeAboveSeaLevel and the other usesQzwZ. So, too, is the
case with the Overarching Properties. The Overarching Properties are labeled In-tent, Correctness, and Innocuity, but they could be labeled Angie, Deanna, andTrish, with no change in meaning at all.
8As the brilliant theologian and philosopher Jonathan Edwards wrote long ago, “O, how is the
world darkened, clouded, distracted, and torn to pieces by those dreadful enemies of mankind called
words” [7].
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The requisites and assumptions do not directly affect the meaning of the Over-
arching Property, but they do affect when the meaning is relevant to a particular
product. Finally, constraints apply to what is required to be demonstrated to justify
that a product possesses an Overarching Property. These distinctions may not be
completely clear now, but they should be clear by the time you finish reading the
rest of this section.
The order of presentation in this section generally tracks Figure 1. The lone ex-
ception concerns definitions, which are not discussed in a separate section all their
own. Because definitions, requisites, assumptions, and constraints all use lettered
lists, to distinguish clearly among them, all lettered items are preceded by D, R, A,
or C as appropriate. For example, the definition for Implementation, which is defi-
nition c, is labeled D.c in the text.
3.1 Statements
As noted already, the three Overarching Properties are labeled Intent, Correctness,
and Innocuity. Here are the statements of each.
Intent: The defined intended behavior is correct and complete with re-spect to the desired behavior.
Correctness: The implementation is correct with respect to its definedintended behavior, under foreseeable operating conditions.
Innocuity: Any part of the implementation that is not required by thedefined intended behavior has no unacceptable impact.
We now list and explain the definitions, which we hope provide to all readers a
common understanding of the meaning of each of the three statements. We begin
with the definitions applicable to the Intent statement.
3.1.1 Intent
Here is the Intent statement repeated:
Intent: The defined intended behavior is correct and complete with re-spect to the desired behavior.
Defined intended behavior is the first phrase in the Intent statement, and it also
occurs in the statements for Correctness and Innocuity. It is a phrase that you prob-
ably have never seen before. You may be tempted to try to define it by considering
separately each of the three words the phrase comprises. Resist the temptation. In-
stead consider the specific definition provided, along with the provided definition
for desired behavior:
D.a. Desired behavior: Needs and constraints expressed by the stake-holders (this includes those needs and constraints identified by thesafety assessment and those mandated by regulations).
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D.b. Defined intended behavior: The record of the desired behavior.
The phrase “needs and constraints” encompasses everything the stakeholders
(more about that word in a moment) want the product to do, along with anything
that theywant to ensure it does not do. Note in this context, theword ’needs’ is used
a bit more loosely thanmight be anticipated on first glance, because it includes both
what is ’needed’ and what is ’wanted’. But the phrase “needs and constraints” is
fairly commonly understood to expand the connotation of ’needs’ in this way.Stakeholders is not further defined, because its normal meaning is appropriate.
The stakeholders include anyone and everyone who has an interest in, and the au-
thority to influence, what the product is designed to do. Themembers of this group
are likely to vary depending on the nature of the product. However, as the paren-
thetical remark emphasizes, regardless of who the specific stakeholders are for a
given product, the “needs and constraints” in the desired behavior must always
include anything identified by the safety assessment 9, and, of course, anything
necessary to satisfy applicable regulations.
So, speaking a bit loosely but without compromising accuracy, the desired be-haviormay be said to be the collective intellectual understanding of what the stake-
holders (including safety people and regulators) need the product to do. The de-fined intended behavior is thus a physical representation (that is, a record) of this
intellectual understanding. One prototypical example of such a physical represen-
tation is a collection of requirements.
We can now understand the meaning of the Intent OP statement. It requires
that the physical representation10 be correct and complete with respect to the in-
tellectual understanding. That is, the physical representation includes everything
that is part of the intellectual understanding, and does so in a way that accurately
captures the meaning of that understanding. Or, in well-known informal phrases,
the Intent OP requires that “you get the requirements right,” or, “you specify the
right system.”
3.1.2 Correctness
Here is the Correctness statement repeated:
Correctness: The implementation is correct with respect to its definedintended behavior, under foreseeable operating conditions.
In addition to the phrase we have already seen (defined intended behavior), two
more defined phrases appear in the statement (implementation and foreseeable op-erating conditions) and a third (item) is introduced in the definition of implemen-tation. These definitions are as follows:
9We defer discussing the specific definition of the term until a bit later in Section 3.1.3. For now,
simply think of it as designating everything that is done to determine what has to be done to ensure
the product is as safe as it needs to be.
10Here and elsewhere in the document the phrase physical representation includes representations
that exist only in electronic form.
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D.c. Implementation: Item or combination of inter-related items forwhich acceptance or approval is being sought.
D.d. Item: a hardware or software element having bounded and well-defined interfaces.
D.e. Foreseeable operating conditions: External and internal conditionsin which the system is used, encompassing all known normal and ab-normal conditions.
The word implementation is difficult to define generically. Although agreeing
on a generic definition is hard, identifying whether a specific something is an im-plementation is usually simple11.
The definition used here combines two distinct notions. The first of these no-
tions incorporates the definition of item, which is the same here as it is in some
existing standards (for example [5]), to emphasize the necessity of bounded and
well-defined interfaces. Prototypical examples of entities that satisfy this first part
of the definition include software systems and hardware devices.
The secondnotion incorporated into the definition is that it applies only to some-
thing for which approval or acceptance is being sought (that is, somethingwe have
called a “product” in early text). So, for the purposes of applying the OPs, an entity
for which approval is not being sought is not considered an implementation.
The definition of foreseeable operating conditions combines the notions of the
full range of (1) external circumstances that the product may encounter during its
operation, and (2) internal states that may exist within the product, whether those
circumstances or states occur regularly during normal operations or only during ab-
normal operations. The phrase all known establishes an exception for circumstances
or states outside the ken of the developers and regulators.
Two extremes must be guarded against when determining the foreseeable op-erating conditions for a specific implementation. One extreme is adopting a dan-
gerously weak conception of what can be known, and dismissing all circumstances
or states that are conceptually possible but deemed to be extremely improbable to
occur. The other extreme is adopting an impossibly strong conception, and, for ex-
ample, requiring consideration of every single external circumstance that anyone
can possibly imagine. Striking the balance between these two extremes is required
today under current regulatory frameworks. A regulatory framework based on the
OPs would not change how the balance is struck.
Just as determining the balance point is not easy today, it will not be any easier
under an OP-based regime, but neither should it be any harder. History seems to
show, however, that the greater danger lies in underestimating, not overestimating,
the range of circumstances and states that are feasible. Hence, we have chosen not to
explicitly qualify, with phrases such as “reasonably expected to occur,” themeaning
of “all known” in the text. We are relying on established practices and common
sense to supply the appropriate qualifications for each specific product, as has been
done in aviation for decades.
11As Justice Potter Stewart famously wrote in another context, “... I know it when I see it ...” [8].
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We can now understand the meaning of the Correctness OP statement. It re-
quires that the entity for which approval is sought correctly instantiates a physical
representation of the intellectual understanding of what the stakeholders need the
product to do. The product must not only be correct under normal anticipated
circumstances and states, it must also be correct—or, to use a term commonly used
today, robust—under abnormal circumstances and states. Or, using thewell-known
informal phrase within the software industry, the Correctness OP statement re-
quires that “you build the system right”. Thus, a product that possesses the Cor-rectness OP will “do the right things”.
3.1.3 Innocuity
Here is the Innocuity12 statement repeated:
Innocuity: Any part of the implementation that is not required by thedefined intended behavior has no unacceptable impact.
This statement introduces only one new explicitly defined phrase, but its defi-
nition uses the phrase safety assessment, which we saw earlier and deferred dis-
cussing until now.
D.f. unacceptable impact: An impact that compromises the safety as-sessment.
The definition of unacceptable impact is another instance inwhich greater speci-
ficity in the general case is not feasible. But for any given specific product, reaching
agreemment about whether a particular change compromises the safety assess-ment will often be easy. When agreeing is not easy, applying existing methods for
assessing hazard severity should still make it possible. Whether easy or hard the
need to reach agreement between applicant and approval authority on this issue is
no different in an OP-based regime than it is using current approval practices.
D.g. Safety assessment The systematic identification of failure con-ditions and classifications in an operational context, evaluation of thearchitecture against safety objectives arising from these hazards, eval-uation of potential common modes and threats, defining additional in-tended behaviors to support claims within these evaluations and show-ing that the safety objectives are satisfied by the implementation.
Although this definition of safety assessmentmay seem a bit complicated, the
intent of the definition is simple: to encompass all of the activities that are done
to determine the needs and constraints on the product necessary to ensure the
12For readers unfamiliar with this word, it is identical in meaning to the longer, less aesthetically
pleasing word innocousness. Both mean (unhelpfully), “The quality of being innocuous” [9], or (help-
fully) substituting themeaning of innocuous [10], “The quality of being not hurtful or injurious; harm-
less.” Since that meaning expresses the essence of the quality this OP demands from a product, the
label fits well.
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product is as safe as it needs to be. In keepingwith long-standing practicewithin the
aviation industry these activities center around identifying failure conditions, for
which we have our final explicit definition. It is identical in all substantive aspects
to the definition in AMC 25-1309 [11], and hence any further explanation is more
likely to cause confusion than enlightment13.
D.h. Failure condition: A condition having an eect on the aircraftand/or its occupants, either direct or consequential, which is causedor contributed to by one or more failures or errors, considering flightphase and relevant adverse operational or environmental conditions orexternal events.
With these three definitions in mind, we see that the meaning of the Innocuity
OP statement is at once both seemingly self-evident and subtle. The self-evidency is,
well, self-evident: nothing extra in the implementation can negatively affect safety.
The subtlety stems from the reason this OP is needed at all. Why is the im-plementation not restricted to contain only that which is required by the definedintended behavior? There are two primary reasons.
One reason is to account for the possibility that the chosen way to build a par-
ticular product may involve the use of previously developed items, even when only
part of an item directly addresses a need or constraint recorded in the defined in-tended behavior. So long as the unneeded parts of the item can be shown to not
compromise the safety assessment, this OP allows it to be used.
The other reason is to provide additional assurance that those things known
within the industry as “derived requirements”14 are handled so as to not introduce
any safety problems. These “derived requirements” should be included within thedesired behavior as “needs and constraints” and industry-standard practices should
be followed to ensure that all such requirements are passed to safety people to an-
alyze.
One informal phrase that expresses the meaning of this Overarching Property
is, “do no wrong things” (where wrong means unsafe). Another is “do no harm.”
13If you are taken aback by the concentration on failures, this footnote is for you. The aviation
industry is aware of the school of thought that defines ’failure’ so narrowly as to include only instances
in which an entity does not do what it is explicitly specified to do (or, to use the language of the OPs,
the entity does not possess the property of Correctness). But the industry does not adopt this narrow
definition. An instance in which an entity does not do what it is intended to do is a failure, even if
the cause can be traced to mistakes in properly recording the intent. In OP language, not possessingIntent or Innocuitymay also contribute to failures.
14For readers who have not previously heard of this phrase, “derived requirements” is the name
given to requirements that arise from development decisions other than requirements refinement de-
cisions. Hence, in this phrase, unlike in normal usage, ’derived’ is an antonym of ’refined’ instead of
a synonym. Ensuring that these “derived requirements” do not cause safety problems in the imple-
mentation is necessary for them to be acceptable. Both [5] [p. 11] and [3] [p. 112] have glossary entries
for the phrase. The entries are not identical to one another, but they are not mutually contradictory
either.
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3.1.4 Informal Summary
Here are two differently worded but equivalent informal expressions of the mean-
ing of the OP statements.
A product that possesses the three Overarching Properties will
• be specified properly (Intent)
• do the right things (Correctness)
• do no wrong things (Innocuity)
In a product that possesses the three Overarching Properties
• what the product is supposed to do is properly captured (Intent)
• the product does what it is supposed to do (Correctness)
• the product does not cause harm (Innocuity)
3.1.5 Relationship to each other
In one sense the three Overarching Properties are independent of one another. For
example, it is possible for a product to possess Intent and Innocuity but not Cor-rectness: what it is supposed to do (desired behavior) is properly captured (in thedefined intended behavior) and it does nothing harmful, but the implementation is not
correct in some way. As another example, consider the conventional wisdom that
many (some would say, most) errors are really requirements errors. A product that
conforms to this conventional wisdom (that is, it has requirements errors) would
not possess Intent, but it may possess Correctness: it does what it is supposed to
do, but what it is supposed to do was not properly captured. It may, or may not,
possess Innocuity.
In another sense, however, the threeOverarching Properties are interdependent.
Possession of all three is necessary for a product to warrant approval, with one pos-
sible exception for products that provide no functions that can possibibly impact
safety. An argument can bemade that possessing Innocuity is unnecessary for such
a product. A counter-argument can be also be made that possessing Innocuity in
such a case is trivial, and thus no harm is done by saying that all products, regard-
less of criticality, must possess it.
Anotherway inwhich theOPs are independent is that no ordering among them is
prescribed or implied. An applicant does not first have to dowhat is needed to show
the possession of Intent, and then what is needed to show Correctness, followed
last by Innocuity. Rather an applicant must dowhatever is needed to show the final
product possesses Intent and Correctness and Innocuity.
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3.1.6 Relationship to time
One of the most difficult concepts for many people to grasp when first encounter-
ing the Overarching Properties concerns the relationship of the OPs to time15. The
product must only be shown to possess the OPs at the end of its development16,
that is, when the product is being considered for approval. It is easy to erroneously
extrapolate from this fact to a belief that anOP-based approval processwould neces-
sarily allow an applicant to “wait until the end” to engagewith approval authorities
or run tests or analyses or do a host of other things that are done today throughout
the development and assurance life-cycle.
The following double conditional is theoretically true: if an applicant waited
until the end to produce evidence that their product possessed the Overarching
Properties, and if that evidence was in fact sufficient to demonstrate possession,
then their product would warrant approval. But in practice, even without consider-
ing time-based requirements that may be imposed by the process evaluation crite-
ria, it is nearly impossible for the second conditional to true. Evidence produced
only at “the end” will almost certainly result in moving “the end” to a much later
date than originally planned and at much higher cost, in order to demonstrate that
the properties are actually possessed. An applicant attempting to claim otherwise
should not expect to obtain approval.
This completes the discussion of the first two parts of the description of the
Overarching Properties: statements and definitions. We now consider in turn the
remaining three parts: requisites, assumptions, and constraints. In doing so, we
will also need to introduce two more definitions.
3.2 Requisites
Recall from Section 3 that requisites encompass that which must exist to allow the
possibility of demonstrating a product possesses the Overarching Properties. They
do not constrain how the demonstrationmust be done, nor affect directly the mean-
ing of the OPs, but simply establish certain conditions that must be true before a
successful demonstration of property possession is even possible. Or, because each
of the conditions involve existence of something, another way to look at the requi-
sites is as setting a minimal set of necessary evidence.
R.a Defined intended behavior exists.
Although the means by which the defined intended behavior is created is not
prescribed in any way by the Overarching Properties, defined intended behavior
must exist to allow possession of any of the OPs to be shown.
15The concept of time itself is unexpectedly difficult to understand, as Augustine explained nearly
two millennia ago: “For what is time? Who can easily and briefly explain it? Who can even compre-
hend it in thought or put the answer into words? Yet is it not true that in conversation we refer to
nothing more familiarly or knowingly than time? And surely we understand it when we speak of it;
we understand it also when we hear another speak of it. What, then, is time? If no one asks me, I
know what it is. If I wish to explain it to him who asks me, I do not know.” Bk.11, Ch. 14, Sec 17. [12]
16Continued airworthiness is not considered here, but one imagines that a later showing of contin-
uing possession of the OPs would likely be necessary.
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R.b Failure conditions are defined.
R.c The record of the safety assessment exists.
Requisites (R.b) and (R.c) emphasize the critical place occupied by safety as-sessment within an OP-based approval regime. Without it, the desired behavior
might not contain all the needs and constraints necessary to ensure adequate safety.
R.d The record of the foreseeable operating conditions exists.
Requisite R.d ensures that the foreseeable operating conditions are recorded
and not simply an intellectual understanding, which might vary from one person
to another.
R.e The implementation exists.
The need for the existence of an implementation (R.e) may seem so obvious as to
not require its statement. It is included, however, to preclude the possibility some-
onemight try to demonstrate a product possesses the Overarching Properties with-
out using the actual product in the demonstration. Certainly some aspects of the
demonstration of property possession may be doable before the actual implemen-tation is finished, but not all of the demonstration can be done that way.
R.f Design Assurance Level (DAL) assignments based on failure condi-tion classification exist.
The assignment of DALs17 based on the failure conditions serves to allow the
possibility of applying differing levels of confidence to the evidence supporting OP
possession claims. Note, however, that the concept of DALs appears nowhere else
in the Overarching Property statements themselves, but is included in constraint
C.b. Additionalmaterial about DALswill be included in the future document about
using and evaluating OPs.
3.3 Assumptions
Recall from the opening of Section 3 that assumptions need only be stated, not ex-
plicitly justified, in the demonstration of the Overarching Properties. Two assump-
tions are included in the Overarching Properties description:
A.a. Stakeholders have the knowledge to express the desired behavior.
A.b. Performing safety assessment is not covered by these OverarchingProperties.
17In the absence of a generally accepted generic term for the concept of differing levels of assurance,
we use DAL here generically. It should not be thought of as identical to any specific current collection
of levels.
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Some readers from outside the aviation domain may wonder why Stakeholder
knowledge is an assumption and not a requirement. The long-standing and suc-
cessful practice in aviation has been to infer competence from the successful adher-
ence to the applicable guidelines and regulations. The OPs assume the practice will
continue to be successful. Should future events, however, be inconsistent with past
history, the OPs can be easily modified by converting A.a into a constraint.
While the existence of safety assessment is required by the OPs, the actual as-
sessments are not themselves something that can be shown to possess theOverarch-
ing Properties. The future document about evaluating OP possession will provide
additional information about the practical implications of this fact.
3.4 Constraints
Constraints are different from the other four parts of the Overarching Properties
description. They apply directly and only to the means by which OP possession may be
demonstrated. That is, they constrain what is considered a legitimate demonstration,
but without changing the meaning of the OPs in any way. Eight constraints are
enumerated. We list and comment on each separately.
The first constraint concerns the entire process of showing OP possession:
C.a. The process to ensure possession of the Overarching Propertiesmust be defined and conducted as defined.
This constraint does not prescribe what particular processes18 must be used, but
it does require that an applicant define the processes that will be used, and follow
those processes once they are defined. To use the simpliest terms, this constraint
requires that planning be done and the plans followed. It is consistent with current
practices, which require the recording of the process that will be used in developing
and assuring a product, and the showing that the documented process has been
followed.
The second constraint applies specifically to the demonstration of Intent pos-
session:
C.b. The means by which the defined intended behavior is shown to becorrect and complete is commensurate with the DAL.
This constraint explicitly allows for different means to be used to show pos-
session of the Intent property depending on the product’s DAL. The phrase com-mensurate with indicates that higher DALs should require stronger demonstration.
Similar constraints are not explicitly imposed on the means for showing Correct-ness or Innocuity. Satisfying C.b should result in DAL-commensurate activities
18Process and processes are used interchangeably here, because the two seemingly different words
(one singular, one plural) are used interchangeably by nearly everyone within the aviation domain.
For example, the process is said to contain a bunch of processes.
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being applied for those OPs, also19.
The third and fourth constraints concern the artifacts that are produced through-
out development and assurance of the product. The third constraint reads as fol-
lows:
C.c. Criteria for evaluating the artifacts are defined and shown to besatisfied individually and collectively.
This constraint does not prescribe the criteria20 for evaluating artifacts (more on
this word in a moment), but it does require that criteria be defined, and that these
criteria be applied to the individual artifacts and to the collection of artifacts.
The fourth constraint applies to the management of these artifacts:
C.d. All artifacts are under configurationmanagement and change con-trol.
Similarly, this constraint does not prescribe the particular configurationmanage-
ment and change control processes or tools that must be used, but it does require
that both configuration management and change control be applied to all artifacts.
In this constraint, the terms configuration management and change control are
used broadly to encompass all aspects of ensuring the artifacts are managed well.
These terms should not be thought of as restricted in meaning to the meaning spec-
ified in any existing standard or guidance document.
Before we discuss the next constraint, here is the promisedmore about the word
artifact. The current version of theOverarchingProperties does not include theword
among the definitions. Some earlier versions did, while others did not. An explicit
definition is not included now, under the assumption that the general meaning of
the word is sufficiently well established within the aviation community. The intent
is that the word applies only to the entities that play a role in the demonstration
of a product’s possession of one or more of the OPs. There may be some entities
produced during development that are not used in any demonstration. ConstraintsC.c and C.d do not apply to those entities.
The fifth constraint applies specifically to the acceptablemeans for showing pos-
session of the Correctness property:
C.e. When tiers of decomposition are used, the means of showing cor-rectness among the tiers and to the defined intended behaviormust bedefined and conducted as defined.
19If it turns out in practice that this constraint as written does not ensure DAL-commensurate activ-
ities for the other two OPs, then a simple solution is to remove C.b and modify C.a to read as follows:The process to ensure possession of the Overarching Properties must be defined, conducted asdefined, and commensurate with the DAL.
20The criteria mentioned here are not to be confused with the evaluation criteria mentioned in Sec-
tion 1.1. The criteria here are the means of evaluating the acceptability of specific artifacts and col-
lections of artifacts. One example of criteria that an applicant may define for evaluating software test
results is “The testing-related objectives from DO-178C are satisfied.”
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This constraint exists to address concerns about the amount of flexibility that
should be allowed within decomposition based-approaches to product develop-
ment. These concerns are motivated by the comparatively high degree of prescrip-
tion on the subject in typical aviation guidance documents today. DO-178C [3] for
example is usually perceived to mandate the use of multiple tiers 21 of decomposi-
tion, the establishment of specified attributes at each tier, and the showing of spec-
ified relationships among the tiers.
The Correctness OP statement mentions only two tiers: the highest (definedintended behavior) and the lowest (implementation). It says nothing about anything
in between the two. From an abstract standpoint, this is exactly right. All that
ultimately matters is whether the product does what it is supposed to do.
Fromapractical standpoint, however, given the current state-of-the-practice, theimplementation for all but extremely simple productswill almost certainly be devel-
oped through multiple tiers of decomposition, even if multiple tiers are not explic-
itly required. For these tier-based developments, the constraint requires more than
just a demonstration that the lowest tier is correct with respect to the highest tier.
Because the current state-of-the-art does not provide a trustworthy way to make
such a demonstration (except in unrealistically simple cases), the constraint also re-
quires ameans to be defined for demonstrating that one tier is correct with respect
to the tier above it, and that this defined means be followed (that is, conducted asdefined).
Please note that the constraint does not prescribe what themeansmust be. Nor
does it prescribe that the means for showing correctness of tier n with respect to
tier n− 1must be the same as the means for showing correctness of tier n− 1with
respect to tier n − 2. Nor does it prescribe that the defined means must permit
demonstrating correctness of any arbitrary tier with respect to any arbitrary higher
level tier.
Here is an example illustrating what this constraint does and does not require.
Consider an implementation developed using three intermediate tiers of decompo-
sition, yielding a total of five tiers. Let’s lable the defined intended behavior as tier
0, the implementation as tier 4, and the intermediate tiers as tier 1, tier 2, and tier 3.
The Correctness property by itself only requires showing tier 4 is correct withrespect to tier 0. C.e, however, adds the additional requirement of addressing cor-
rectness among the tiers. Onemeans to do so is serially: show tier 1 is correct with
respect to (icwrt) tier 0; tier 2 icwrt tier 1; tier 3 icwrt tier 2; tier 4 icwrt tier 3; and
then explain why these serial relationships are sufficient (for this particular prod-
uct) to establish tier 4 icwrt tier 0. A separate demonstration of tier 4 icwrt tier 0 is
not required to satisfy C.e22.
The sixth constraint also applies to demonstrating Correctness:
21DO-178C does not use the word tiers, but instead refers to levels of requirements. Each level of
requirements constitutes a tier (as described in [13]), as does any other instance of refinement, such
as source code, which is refined from low-level requirements.
22Which does not mean, of course, that for a specific product an approval authority is forbidden
from adding additional constraints on what constitutes an acceptable means for demonstrating tier-
based correctness.
18
C.f. The implementation must be correct when functioning as part ofthe integrated system or in environment(s) representative of the inte-grated system.
This constraint exists to ensure that demonstrations of Correctness take place
in either the actual system in which the product will be used, or in one or more
environments that represent the actual system in all relevant aspects.
Constraint (C.f) may seem out of place to readers who are familiar only with
software aspects of aviation systems. On the other hand, readers familiarwith hard-
ware products will likely understand immediately why the constraint is included.
C.g. All design and manufacturing data to support consistent replica-tion of the type design and instructions for continued airworthinessmust be established.
This constraint concerns the handoff from development organizations to man-
ufacturing and operations organizations. It exists to ensure that the product for
which OP possession has been demonstrated is the same product that is manu-
factured and operated. It thus requires that the demonstration of OP possession
includes evaluation of the means established to ensure the integrity of the manu-
facturing or replication processes, and also of the means of passing on any needed
instructions for maintaining continued airworthiness.
The final constraint addresses the adequacy of the safety analysis:
C.h. The safety assessment must address all of the implementation.
The safety assessmentmust account for all of the implementation either directly
or by indentifying limits on portions of the implementation that cannot be analyzed
directly (such as COTS).
This constraint also precludes a demonstration that employs only a partial safetyassessment. As an example of something that could happen without this con-
straint, consider Innocuity. Someonemight erroneously believe demonstrating pos-
session of Innocuity could consider in isolation only the part of the implementation
that is not required by the defined intended behavior. As a result they might use
only part of the results of the safety assessment, which would likely ignore the po-
tential interactions with the part of the implementation that is required.
Having brought to a close the explanation of the Overarching Properties, we
turn now to a brief discussion of four practical questions.
4 Practicalities
Although the purpose of this document is to explain the meaning of the Overar-
ching Properties and not to provide guidance on using them, a few remarks about
potential questions that are likely to arise in practice seem appropriate. As men-
tioned several times already, another document will be written explaining the use
and evaluation of the OPs.
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4.1 Supplant or supplement?
Despite many statements to the contrary at the public unveiling of the Overarching
Properties in 2016, and evenmore statements since, the perception still exists within
parts of the community that the OPs are intended to supplant the existing approval
processes and guidance documents. That is, if anOP-based approach is recognized,
then companies who would prefer to continue using, for example, DO-178C for
software aspects of certification will be required to stop it and use the OPs instead
on future projects. ’Tis not true. Not true at all.
The current intent is for the OPs to provide a different path for approval, a path
that does not supplant the current path, but rather supplements it with another
choice to consider. The new choice is intended to be more abstract and less pre-
scriptive, and thus allow greater flexibility.
No one who prefers the current path will be forced to choose the new one. Also,
for thosewhowant to try theOP path, an easyway to try it the first timewould be to
propose complying with an existing guidance document as the process to ensurepossession of the Overarching Properties (see constraint C.a).
4.2 What about sufficiency?
Recall this foundational concept from Section 2: the Overarching Properties rest
on the assumption that they constitute a sufficient set of properties to establish the
suitability of a product for installation on an aircraft. Recall also the admission that
the sufficiency of the OPs has not yet been demonstrated conclusively.
Although no conclusive demonstration has been made, there exists anecdotal
evidence to suggest the plausibility of assuming sufficiency at this point. Beginning
at the 2016 public workshop and continuing to this day, doubters of the sufficiency
of theOPs have been challenged to produce a counter example demonstrating insuf-
ficiency. That is, to conceive of a product that can be demonstrated (conceptually) to
possess the OPs and to also have flaws that should prevent it from being approved
for installation on an aircraft. To date, no one has produced a counter example. Of
course, absence of a counter example is not proof, but it is suggestive, and consistent
with how most scientific hypotheses are evaluated.
Suggestive also of sufficiency is the informal argument sketched in Section 2, as
are some incomplete, but promising, attempts to formalize an argument. It seems
reasonable to believe that the OPs are either truly sufficient or close enough to suf-
ficient that any actual insufficiencies can not be revealed except by attempting ap-
plication in the real world, or something close to it.
Also, the consideration of sufficiency should be done within the historical con-
text. Actual abstract sufficiency of current approaches has never beendemonstrated,
but these current approaches have a long track record of impressive practical suffi-
ciency. Perhaps an OP-based approach does not need a definitive demonstration of
actual sufficiency either, so long as it is shown to have practical sufficiency.
20
4.3 How many DIBs are allowed?
The Overarching Properties are clear. For the purpose of gaining (if you are an ap-
plicant) or granting (if you are an authority) approval for a product to be installed
on an aircraft, there exists the desired behavior for the product, along with its as-
sociated defined intended behavior (affectionately referred to by many as the DIB)
and implementation. Nothing is mentioned about multiple instances of the DeB23
and DIB pairs.
This lack ofmention should not be interpreted as prohibitingmultiple instances.
Whether having them is a good idea depends on the specific product to which the
OPs are being applied and also, perhaps, to the organizational structure being used
to develop it.
Consider a simple example: a hardware device to accomplish a single task being
developed within a single company for use by that company. In this simple case, a
singleDeB instantiated in a singleDIB seems appropriate, withOP possession being
demonstrated accordingly. Identifying the stakeholderswho will produce the DeB
should be simple.
Consider, on the other hand, a highly complex example: the entity for which
approval is sought is a subsystem implementing multiple functions containing sev-
eral software elements running on different hardware devices, each of which will
be developed by different companies. In this complex case, using only a single DeB
and DIB seems absurd. Ultimately the subsystem will have to be demonstrated to
possess the three OPs, but that demonstration will certainly compromise multiple
instantiations of demonstrations of the subsystem components possessing the OPs
with respect to specific DeBs and DIBs refined from the originals. The stakeholders
for each of these DeBs may well be different.
4.4 Whither evaluation?
Despite previous explicit statements consigning to another paper the issue of how
to evaluate OP possession, some readers are assuredly still hoping to read some
useful words on the subject here. Abandon your hope now.
Abstractly, evaluatingwhether a product possesses Intent, Correctness, and In-nocuity is not necessarily difficult. An applicant following an OP-based approval
path could be required to create an argument24 explaining why they have justified
belief (to an appropriate level of confidence) their product possesses the OPs. The
argument would constitute the approval basis, serve as a primary means of com-
munication between the applicant and the approval authority, and be the object of
evaluation. Standard methods for evaluating the cogency of arguments would be
applied.
Concretely, however, it is too soon to knowwhether such an approach can work
in practice. Standard ways of evaluating arguments are not foolproof, require train-
ing and experience to use, and are not necessarily always straightforward to apply
23Inexplicably, using this word to refer to desired behavior has not yet caught on. It will.
24Theword argument is used here, as it has been used for centuries, to include not only the reasoning
but also the claims and the evidence associated with the reasoning.
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even for experienced people. Only time will tell if a suitable argument-based eval-
uation approach (or collection of approaches) can be developed.
5 Postlude
The Overarching Properties provide an intellectually appealing new approach for
obtaining justified belief in the suitability of a product for inclusion on an aircraft.
Whether the OPs will go beyond intellectual appeal to practical application is an
open question. The question remains open, but steps are underway to close it.
A European consortium recently completed a series of case studies. The National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is conducting a different case study
and continues to pursue avenues for conducting additional ones. And small, but
real, industry-based projects are underway with legitimate hopes for more to begin
soon. A promising future for the OPs appears plausible.
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Appendix: Images
This appendix displays several variations of images that seem appropriate for pro-
viding a graphical identity to the Overarching Properties. Readers who would like
copies of these images may get them by contacting the author.
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